According to Arrow and Lind (1970), as the net returns of an investment are shared by increasingly many shareholders, the risk premium for the respective shareholders vanishes and the aggregate of these premiums approaches zero. We test Arrow and Lind's hypothesis of relationship between ownership concentration and perceived risk. We find strong and robust results that investors value higher companies and managers are more likely to invest in fixed assets and hold less cash in companies with dispersed ownership. Both results are interconnected: investors' lower liquidity premiums and managers' risk-neutral behavior contribute to higher valuations.
markets.
Limited attention has been paid to the relationship between ownership concentration, risk perception, and valuation. Previous studies focused on management (insider) ownership and institutional breadth. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 large Fortune 500 firms, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) found evidence that the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of firms behaves nonmonotonically: valuation increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as insider ownership rises. Basing on data from mutual fund holdings, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) showed that low breadth-i.e., when few investors have long positions-signals that that prices are high relative to fundamentals. Cho (1998) proved that corporate value affects ownership structure, but not vice versa, and put into question the assumption that ownership structure is exogenously determined.
Prevailing asset pricing theories black-box the interrelation between the structure of the demand-side of valuation-investors-and the risk-taking behavior of managers. Using novel investor-level data on ownership structure, we test this relationship in the light of the consigned to oblivion Arrow and Lind's (1970) theorem of public investments.
Ownership Concentration, Risk Premium, and Valuation
According to the Arrow-Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind 1970, further, we will refer to this article by 'A-L'), "as the net returns of an investment of a given size are shared by increasingly many individuals, the risk premium for the respective individuals vanishes and, more importantly and perhaps surprisingly, the aggregate of these premiums for all individuals also approaches zero" (Fisher 1973, 772) .
On a side note, 1 Arrow and Lind commented that "if each stockholder's share in the firm is a small component of his income, the cost of risk-bearing to him will be very small" (A-L 376). It then follows that "if managers were acting in the interest of the firm's shareholders, they would essentially ignore risks and choose investments with the highest expected returns" (A-L 376). Thus according to A-L, the more dispersed the shareholder structure is, the more risk neutral managers should behave.
On the one hand, shareholders with small stakes in companies value them at lower risk premium and, on the other hand, managers in companies with less concentrated ownership enjoy more discretion and are less risk averse in selecting projects. Therefore, there are two channels of interaction between ownership concentration and corporate valuation:
(a) Small individual stock positions, more stock liquidity −→ lower premium, higher valuation Idiosyncratic events have lower impact on diversified portfolios: small stock positions are easier to sell without negatively affecting price. Thus, investors demand lower liquidity premium for firms with less concentrated ownership.
(b) Small individual stock positions, more managerial discretion −→ lower required return cutoff, less idle cash holdings, more investment projects, higher valuation Managers who enjoy more discretion behave risk neutral: screen projects at a lower discount rate (invest more and more promptly) and hold less idle cash in companies with less concentrated ownership. Highly valued companies yield below average returns if sold off, hence investors do not keep large stock holdings. This is in line with Cho (1998) , but only as a second-order clientele effect.
We formulate the following research hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Lower ownership concentration leads to higher firm valuation.
Hypothesis 2 Lower ownership concentration leads to higher managerial discretion. 
Data and Empirical Results
In this section we show empirical evidence supporting the applicability of A-L theorem to corporations. We demonstrate in our sample that firm value (captured by different measures of P/E ratio) and managerial discretion proxies as measures of risk aversion are in part determined by a company's ownership structure.
P/E ratio is undoubtedly a noisy signal of risk appraisal by investors. We believe, however, it is well-suited to our purpose. Because we are interested in the predictable effects of a firm's ownership structure on its value, it seems natural to look at the cross-sectional relationship between ownership and value, focusing on alternative measures of P/E. In order to properly study the effect of a company's ownership structure on its P/E ratio, we need to control for other variables potentially impacting the P/E ratio. In particular, we hold constant firm's leverage ratio and size, as these characteristics have been shown in the literature to affect firm's valuation. Size seems to be an important factor attributed to P/E ratios (Jaffe, Keim, and Westerfield 1989) . Previous research indicates that two important factors affecting the variation of the company P/E ratios are growth and risk. Growth is traditionally measured as the change in net earnings, and risk as the market beta. Therefore, if we make a claim that company risk is captured in the P/E ratio, we need to control for the effect of the earnings growth and beta. An early paper by Beaver and Morse (1978) demonstrated that earnings growth is for most part negatively correlated with the P/E ratio.
They measured the earnings growth as the percentage change of earnings per share in the year immediately preceding their measure of the P/E ratio. The relationship was negative in sixteen out of nineteen years of analysis. Beaver and Morse (1978) also noted that the relationship between the P/E ratio and the stock's beta can be both positive and negative. Craig, Johnson, and Joy (1987) showed in their study that the accounting method mattered for the level and dynamics of the P/E ratio. Alford (1992) studied the cross-sectional distribution of P/E ratios and found that industry is an important variable affecting the P/E ratio. Specific (idiosyncratic) risk is normally measured by the company's beta. We prefer, however, to work with P/E ratios instead for a simple reason. As we only have quarterly data, we would not have enough observations to construct reliable time-varying estimates of beta in the sample period. If we believe that the P/E ratio captures the company's present value, then it is determined by present earnings and a discount rate containing both risk and expected growth. Thus, holding other things constant, we can estimate time-varying risk from P/E ratios.
The data sample used in the analysis comprises ownership data of companies listed on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq, and comes from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings database, and Compustat. The sample period is 1980-2011, with quarterly data winsorized at 1% level to exclude outliers. Table (1) presents summary statistics of the firms in the sample.
Firm-quarter observations span from 24 to 308 thousand. The difference in the number of observations comes from source limitations.
We use four different measures of the P/E ratio on a firm level: 1) trailing twelve months P/E ratio, defined as the market value of the company at the end of the quarter divided by the net income of the firm for the most recent 12-month (four-quarter) period; 2) unlevered P/E ratio, trailing twelve months; 3) the Shiller P/E ratio, aka Cyclically-Adjusted Price Earnings ratio (CAPE) or Normalized P/E ratio, calculated as the ratio of the inflation-adjusted market value at the end of a given period over the prior ten-year trailing mean of inflation-adjusted earnings; 4) forward P/E ratio, using I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecast of earnings over the next year instead of net income. 2 On average, firms showed share price ranging from 12 to 20 times earnings, depending on the P/E ratio considered.
For testing managerial discretion, we used for proxies: gross fixed assets growth, cash holdings over assets, acid test ratio defined as current assets minus inventories over current liabilities, and debt structure defined as debt in current liabilities over long-term debt. The average firm grew 4% annually, had cash holdings of 2% of assets, could cover 2.4 times current liabilities with near-liquid assets, and had short-term debt almost equal to long-term debt.
Any institutional investment manager who exercises discretion over $100 million or more is obligated to file form 13f, pursuant to Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
On average firms had five equivalent shareholders (inverse of HHI), 71 institutional owners who owned 36% of the shares. Only in 2% of the firms in the sample the top five investors had more than 50% of the shares and in 8% of the firms of the sample the top ten investors had more than 50% of the shares.
Our control variables show average assets equaled $327 million, financed in one fifth with debt. Annual earnings growth was 22% and calculated return on equity was 13%.
Investors' Perspective: Value and Liquidity Risk Premium
We run panel data regressions with firm-level fixed effects and report standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Table ( 2) demonstrates results on regressions coefficients from the following regression specification:
where i indicates a firm, t is our time variable, Inst. ownership i,t is the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors from Thomson Reuter's 13f database, and HHI i,t is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index defined as:
where N i,t is the number of owners of firm i's shares at time t and s 2 i,t,j is the percentage ownership in company i at time t of owner j. Controls include: natural logarithm of firm's assets, earnings growth defined as EP S t−1 /EP S t−2 , and return on equity with calculated betas. We include year and industry effects. Data is from Thomson Reuters.
We run regressions for the percentage of institutional ownership, number of institutional investors, and top five (ten) voting power as a dummy variable equal to one if five (ten) largest institutional owners have over 50% of outstanding shares. The percentage of institutional ownership and number of institutional owners present similar explanatory power as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of ownership concentration. Top five voting power has no significance and top ten voting power has significance only the Shiller P/E. We thus dropped these variables from our analysis. 3
In more detail, table (2) demonstrates results of a panel data regression of firm-level P/E ratio on firm's controls, including earnings growth dynamics and assets. Presented regressions take into account fixed effects on the firm level. We report a strong and robust relationship between firm's ownership concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and firm's valuation for all measures of P/E. Negative and statistically significant estimates of ownership concentration validates A-L and suggest lower idiosyncratic risk-a premium for liquidity-ownership dispersed. Lower and less significant forward P/E coefficients may point to the fact that analysts do not take into account ownership concentration for their forecasts.
All measures of P/E are also positively correlated with shares owned by institutional investors, number of institutional shareholders, and return on equity based on calculated betas.
Lagged earnings growth has an effect for P/E ratios, only non-significant for the Shiller P/E.
Assets size shows inconsistency of sign and significance in estimates, suggesting other channels of causality between assets size and valuation.
We test, analogously to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , for a non-monotonic relationship between ownership concentration and valuation, controlling for ownership concentration levels by quintiles. The results of the regression models are presented in panel A of table (3). When broken by quintiles of HHI, we find that ownership concentration has a significant impact on the company valuation only in the trailing and unlevered P/E middle quintiles, and Shiller P/E lower and middle quintiles. Therefore HHI is a significant metric between, but not so within quintiles of ownership concentration. This insight is corroborated by testing the relationship between ownership concentration and valuation, controlling for time periods: 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2004-2007, and 2008-2011. The results of the regression models are presented in panel B of table (3). We find that ownership concentration had a significant impact on the company valuation in all periods (with the exception of the 1980s and 1990s for the forward P/E). After disentangling the financial 
Managers' Perspective: Required Return and Managerial Discretion
It is costly and impractical for dispersed shareholders to control managers. Managers who enjoy discretion would show less conservative management and risk averse behavior. Particularly, they would tend to "empire building," i.e., invest in fixed assets at a higher rate, hold less cash as a safety buffer for eventual stockholders' claims, and reveal a more aggressive operational strategy (lower acid test ratio and higher short-term to long-term debt).
Table (4) shows results of regressions of managerial discretion proxies 4 on ownership concentration and controls. We find strong evidence that managers of companies with more concentrated ownership show structural risk aversion: they are prone to invest less in fixed assets and hold more cash. Their overall operational risk aversion, however, measured by the acid test ratio and short/long-term debt structure, has no correlation with ownership concentration. Two proxies of managerial discretion show estimates contrary to our predictions: acid test ratio and short/long-term debt structure. The acid test ratio decreases with ownership concentration for all but top quintile and for all periods but 1980s. Debt structure estimates are unstable when broken into ownership concentration quintiles and are driven by strong estimates of one period-1990s. We disregard short/long-term debt structure as a reliable proxy of managerial discretion.
Our results suggest that managers in companies with concentrated ownership are only structurally conservative, but ambiguously operational risk averse. A plausible explanation 4 See Appendix A for the definition of managerial discretion proxies.
is that managers have (tacit) consent to take operational risky positions as these are easily reversible in case of distress.
Robustness Tests
Panel data regressions with firm-level fixed effects and report standard errors were checked and corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Further checks include reverse causality and stock liquidity.
Reverse Causality
One of our concerns is that the ownership structure, and consequently our concentration measure, is not exogenous. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show evidence that ownership structure, investment, and value are in fact endogenous. With an ampler and more detailed database, we also check Cho's (1998) statement that corporate value affects ownership structure, but not vice versa. This would contradict our findings that ownership concentration has an effect on several measures of corporate value.
Panel data regressions presented in the earlier tables of this study assumed the ownership structure as given exogenously. We circumvent the problem of possible endogeneity between corporate ownership and value by using lagged values of regressors. We run a three-stage least squares regression, where we assume the possibility of endogeneity between corporate valuation, and ownership structure. Results are presented in table (6). The formal representation of the simultaneous equations is as follows:
where Liquidity i,t = Cash/Assets. We control for industry effects. Our results contradict Cho's (1998) 
Stock Liquidity
We build on the literature initiated by Demsetz (1968), followed by Amihud and Mendelson (1989) , and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) in studying the effect of stock liquidity on the corporate value. Demsetz (1968) points out that a larger number of shareholders causes a narrower bid-ask spread. We do not postulate in this paper that a relationship between ownership structure, concentration ratios, and bid-ask spreads is exogenous. We conduct the analysis in two steps. First, we simply add bid-ask spreads as a liquidity measure to our previous regressions with lagged regressors. Table (7) shows results of the regressions. Bid-ask spreads are not significant to company valuation. The relationship between the P/E ratios and the Herfindahl index remains negative and highly significant for three out of four proposed measures of valuation. Only the coefficient on the forward P/E ratio is not significant, however the point estimate remains negative. 
Discussion
It is debatable whether the outperformance tendency of small capitalization and value stocks is due to market efficiency or market inefficiency. On the efficiency side, the outperformance is generally explained by the excess risk that value and small cap stocks face as a result of their higher cost of capital and greater business risk. On the inefficiency side, the outperformance is explained by market participants mispricing the value of these companies, which provides the excess return in the long run as the value adjusts. Marring the two views, small cap and value outperformance can be partly endogenized by investors' appraised liquidity risk and managers' risk aversion.
Among financial analysts, the APT is seen as a "supply-side" model, since its beta coefficients reflect the sensitivity of the underlying asset to economic factors that cause structural changes in assets' expected returns. Managers' discretion and risk aversion affects firms' sensitivity to shocks and profitabilities.
On the other side, the CAPM is considered a "demand side" model. Its results arise from a maximization problem of each investor's utility function and from the resulting market clearing (investors are considered to be the "consumers" of the assets). A sudden shock leading to a need of liquidity would asymmetrically affect returns on large and small stock holdings.
Thus, in equilibrium prices should reflect liquidity premiums.
Concluding Remarks
Results presented in this paper show that firms' value is positively correlated with ownership dispersion by several widely-used valuation measures, across all quintiles of ownership concentration and periods of time, as predicted by Arrow and Lind's (1970) theorem. Managers know investors with small stakes denote lower perceived risk related to their investment-maybe due to lower required liquidity premium-and thus behave more risk neutral structurally: increase fixed assets more rapidly and hold less idle cash. Operationally, however, managers behave more conservatively, the less concentrated ownership is.
Our analysis suggests that valuations models can be enhanced by incorporating measures of ownership concentration. On the policy side, exchange commissions and supervisory agencies may foster real-time fillings on stock holdings. Wide availability of data on stock holdings and ownership concentration may contribute substantially to improve market efficiency.
Appendix A Definitions
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of concentration widely used in industrial organization, competition law and antitrust, and technology management. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares over firms within the industry, where the market shares are expressed as fractions. The result is proportional to the average market share, weighted by market share. It ranges from 0 (for a a huge number of very small firms) to 1 (a single monopolistic producer). Increases in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index generally indicate a decrease in competition and an increase of market power, whereas decreases indicate the opposite. We used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index defined as:
where N i,t is the number of owners of company i's shares at time t and s 2 i,t,j is the percentage ownership in company i at time t of the owner j, to measure ownership concentration. The inverse of HHI gives the hypothetical number of shareholders in the firm provided all had equal number of shares.
We use four measures of P/E ratio: 5 1. Twelve-Month Trailing P/E ratio is defined as the market value of the company at the end of the quarter divided by the net income of the firm for the most recent twelvemonth (four-quarter) period. It is the one most often cited in newspapers and other stock tables. This measure of earnings has the disadvantage of looking backward while the stock market is often looking forward, trying to predict future trends.
Unlevered P/E ratio is calculated with formula:
Since P/E is higher when the firm has lower leverage, to ensure that P/E ratios of companies with different leverage are comparable analysts often calculate unlevered P/E ratio, which adjusts P/E ratios by undoing the effect of leverage (Leibowitz 2002) .
3. The Shiller P/E ratio, aka Cyclically-Adjusted Price Earnings Ratio (CAPE) or Normalized P/E Ratio (Shiller 2005) , is a long-term version of P/E, which is calculated as the ratio of the inflation-adjusted market value at the end of a given period over the prior long-run (e.g., ten-year) trailing mean of inflation-adjusted earnings. The main reason behind the use of this measure is that it smoothes out the extreme peaks and valleys in earnings, giving a better framework for thinking about future earnings power. For example, the Shiller P/E ratio is less susceptible to being thrown out of line by the depressed earnings that are sometimes reported as the economy is emerging from a recession.
4. Forward P/E ratio uses consensus analyst forecast of earnings over the next year instead of net income. The primary advantage of this P/E version is that it, arguably, does a better job aligning the price (the discounted value of future income stream) with the forward-looking measure of earnings (such as analyst consensus forecast) as opposed to backward-looking, already reported, earnings that are no guarantee for the future earnings. This measure, however, may be sensitive to analyst forecasts bias (Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan 1998) and analyst herding (Trueman 1994 ).
We use four proxies of managerial discretion:
1. Fixed assets growth measures the percentage increase in gross value of plant, property, and equipment, i.e., the manager's propensity for "empire building"
Fixed Assets growth i,t = Fixed Assets i,t − Fixed Assets i,t−1 Fixed Assets i,t−1
2. Cash holdings over assets measures the company's safety cushion
3. Acid test ratio, aka Quick ratio to Cash ratio, measures the ability of a company to use its near cash to retire its current liabilities immediately. Near cash include those current assets that presumably can be quickly converted to cash at close to their book values.
The acid test ratio should be one or higher, however this varies widely by industry. In general, the higher the ratio, the greater the company's liquidity (i.e., the better able to meet current obligations using liquid assets) We use four measures of the P/E ratio: 1) twelve-month trailing P/E ratio, defined as the market value of the company at the end of the quarter divided by the net income of the firm for the most recent 12-month (four-quarter) period; 2) unlevered P/E ratio; 3) the Shiller P/E ratio, aka Cyclically-Adjusted Price Earnings ratio (CAPE) or Normalized P/E ratio, calculated as the ratio of the inflation-adjusted market value at the end of a given period over the prior ten-year trailing mean of inflation-adjusted earnings; 4) "Forward" P/E ratio, using I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecast of earnings over the next year instead of net income. Cash holdings are measured over assets. Acid test is defined as current assets minus inventories over current liabilities, and short-term debt is defined as Compustat's debt in current liabilities. Return on equity is given as of the P/E ratio: 1) twelve-month trailing P/E ratio, defined as the market value of the company at the end of the quarter divided by the net income of the firm for the most recent 12-month (four-quarter) period; 2) unlevered P/E ratio; 3) the Shiller P/E ratio, aka Cyclically-Adjusted Price Earnings ratio (CAPE) or Normalized P/E ratio, calculated as the ratio of the inflation-adjusted market value at the end of a given period over the prior ten-year trailing mean of inflation-adjusted earnings; 4) "Forward" P/E ratio, using I/B/E/S consensus analyst forecast of earnings over the next year instead of net income. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of ownership concentration. Controls include: return on equity is given as R
where β E is the annual beta, r m is annualized return on S&P500, and r f is one-month Treasury bill rate, natural logarithm of firm's assets, and earnings growth up to three periods ahead defined as ∆EP S t+n = EP S t+n /EP S t+n−1 , where n = 1, 2, 3.
We only report the coefficient on EP S t+1 . Data are from Thomson Reuters. Sample period is 1980-2011, with quarterly data winsorized at 1%
level. In this and subsequent tables, standard errors are in parenthesis; * denotes significance at 10%, * * significance at 5%, and * * * significance at 1%. 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2004-2007, and 2008-2011 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2004-2007, and 2008-2011 
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